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Abstract
This article will rework the classical question ‘Can a machine think?’ into a more specific problem: ‘Can a machine think 
anything new?’ It will consider traditional computational tasks such as prediction and decision-making, so as to investigate 
whether the instrumentality of these operations can be understood in terms of the creation of novel thought. By addressing 
philosophical and technoscientific attempts to mechanise thought on the one hand (e.g. Leibniz’s mathesis universalis and 
Turing’s algorithmic method of computation), and the philosophical and cultural critique of these attempts on the other, I will 
argue that computation’s epistemic productions should be assessed vis-à-vis the logico-mathematical specificity of formal 
axiomatic systems. Such an assessment requires us to conceive automated modes of thought in such a way as to supersede the 
hope that machines might replicate human cognitive faculties, and to thereby acknowledge a form of onto-epistemological 
autonomy in automated ‘thinking’ processes. This involves moving beyond the view that machines might merely simulate 
humans. Machine thought should be seen as dramatically alien to human thought, and to the dimension of lived experience 
upon which the latter is predicated. Having stepped outside the simulative paradigm, the question ‘Can a machine think 
anything new?’ can then be reformulated. One should ask whether novel behaviour in computing might come not from the 
breaking of mechanical rules, but from following them: from doing what computers do already, and not what we might think 
they should be doing if we wanted them to imitate us.
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1  An imitation game?
Can a machine think? Famously, Alan Turing believed this 
to be a bad question. He argued that it was ambiguous, and 
that it should be replaced with a test: an “imitation game” 
(Turing 1950, 433) that would bypass what he considered 
to be a dangerous haggling over definitions of the terms 
‘machines’ and ‘thinking’, and which would instead link 
the issue of the intelligence of computing machinery to that 
of simulated behaviour.1 That was in 1950, and questions 
about machine thought and issues about simulation have 
remained related ever since. In this article, I will rework 
Turing’s classical problem ‘Can a machine think?’ into the 
more specific issue: ‘Can a machine think anything new?’ I 
will do so in order to entertain the possibility of breaking the 
common association between machine thought and simula-
tion. In my view, addressing questions about the possibility 
of novelty in computation can afford a move away from what 
I will refer to as a simulative paradigm.2 Asking whether a 
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1 “I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’ This 
should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms ‘machine’ 
and ‘think’. The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as 
possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous. 
If the meaning of the words ‘machine’ and ‘think’ are to be found 
by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape 
the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question, ‘Can 
machines think?’ is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gal-
lup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a definition I 
shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and 
is expressed in relatively unambiguous words” (Turing 1950, 433).
2 The philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (1962) used the term 
‘paradigm’ to refer to the sets of normalising concepts and practices 
belonging to the science of a particular period of time. Of course, I 
acknowledge this usage of the term ‘paradigm’ and its popularity. 
However, I am not adopting the expression in this specific Kuhnian 
meaning, but rather, more broadly, I aim to argue that simulation 
constitutes a paradigm insofar as it is an established (although not 
unifying nor normalising) framework of reference (in fact, often, a 
benchmark of success) for the multifaceted field of AI. Equally, it is 
important to add here that by employing the term ‘paradigm’ I do not 
mean to imply that AI is a ‘normal science’ in Kuhn’s sense (i.e. a 
settled, dogmatic and unquestioned ensemble of scientific practices).
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machine can think anything new will then be a way for me 
to engage with issues pertaining to the possibility that com-
putational processing might engender autonomous modes 
of automated epistemic production. In this sense, the ques-
tion of novel thought in computation becomes a vehicle to 
tackle philosophical issues concerning what I will refer to 
here as the onto-epistemological autonomy of computa-
tional automation. I hope to show, therefore, that the ques-
tion ‘Can a machine think anything new?’ can be a useful 
alternative to Turing’s ‘Can a machine think?’: for where 
Turing’s question led to an imitation game, and thereby to 
popular understandings of machine thought as simulative of 
human thought, the issue of novelty in computation helps to 
highlight precisely the opposite, i.e. the difference between 
machine thought and human thought. The novelty at stake 
here is, simply put, that of a new kind of thinking.
The history of computing is characterised by a certain 
degree of enthusiasm regarding the prospect of computing 
machines being able to produce forms of thought. This was 
true in the 1950s, when Turing asked whether machines can 
think, and it is true today, when computing is not just some-
thing that happens in university labs, but is instead a condi-
tion that few worldly activities can evade altogether. Yet, in 
addition to the persistent dream of a thinking machine, the 
suspicion that computational cognitive or intellectual capaci-
ties can, at best, merely imitate human ones has also endured 
from the mid-twentieth century up to the present time. Again, 
when it comes to the question of machine thought, simula-
tion still seems to be our safest bet. If, from the 1950s to 
today, society and culture have often imagined the arrival of 
technologies that can think like humans do (and which, con-
sequently, might also one day want what humans want), then 
the fact that these technical agents might not really be think-
ing as we are, but may only be fooling us into believing that 
they do, has often helped to ease persistent technocultural 
anxieties about the “rise of the robots” (Ford 2015), as well 
as to deflate technoscientific prospects of a “second machine 
age” (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014) in which machines 
substitute rather than complement humans.
The imitation of intelligent behaviour was the success 
threshold that Turing set when considering the cognitive 
capabilities of computing machinery. His imitation game 
heralded the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) as a 
new scientific field of enquiry. It allowed machines to be 
credited as intelligent on the condition that a human was 
not able to distinguish that machine from another human 
on the basis of the answers given to questions put to both 
the machine and the human.3 Whilst it is true that, by way 
of his imitation game, Turing discussed the circumstances 
under which one might determine that a digital computer 
can think, and whilst it is also true that he did not explicitly 
claim that all human thinking is computation (see Harnish 
2002, 184), it is nonetheless the case that the imitation game 
opened up a comparative link between human cognition 
and mechanical calculation. In effect, Turing asked whether 
the algorithmic procedures of discrete-state machines are 
in principle capable of producing a sufficiently convincing 
display of cognitive behaviour.4 The first AI initiatives that 
came after Turing’s enquiry took on this implicit link and 
made it explicit, vis-à-vis the development of computational-
ist theories of the mind in what was then the newly emerging 
discipline of cognitive science.
In my view, technocultural and technoscientific retreats 
into simulation should be read in parallel with these com-
putationalist attempts to mechanise the mind, but also in 
parallel with the twentieth-century development of the 
ancient dream of finding and automating the rules of think-
ing. Philosophical criticisms of these attempts and of this 
dream should in turn be read vis-à-vis the belief that the 
automated cognitive activities of machines are just reduc-
tions or simplifications of the thinking that originates from 
lived experience. This belief, however, is still based on the 
simulative paradigm. In other words, it is grounded on the 
3 The field and name of ‘artificial intelligence’ were coined during 
the Dartmouth Summer Research Project, a 1956 conference held at 
Dartmouth College, in Hanover, New Hampshire. Although there was 
no agreement on a general theory or methodological programme (see 
Moor 2006), the belief that the Turing test (that is, a simplified ver-
4 “Could a computer reply to an interrogator in a way indistinguish-
able from the way a human being might reply, whether adding num-
bers or scanning sonnets? This question (often expressed as whether 
a computer could pass the ‘Turing-test’) has three aspects. Might 
some future computer actually be able to answer in the ways imag-
ined? Are effective procedures in principle capable of generating this 
performance, whether in humans or computers? And would such per-
formance suffice for the attribution of intelligence to the computer? 
Turing’s own answer in each case was ‘Yes’” (Boden 2005, 4).
sion of Turing’s 1950 imitation game) would be passed in less than a 
generation was widely shared amongst the AI pioneers who attended 
the event. So too was the conviction that “every aspect of learning 
or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely 
described that a machine can be made to simulate it” (McCarthy 
et al. 2006, 12). At present, however, and more than sixty years after 
the Dartmouth College conference, the Turing test has still not been 
passed. Moreover, it should also be added that passing the Turing 
test is not the most prominent effort of current research in AI. Focus-
ing too strictly on the human performance of intelligent behaviour is 
considered to be distracting and restricting, and the imitation game 
is seen as an “elusive standard” (Moor 2003) for AI research. Whilst 
it is necessary to acknowledge this condition in order to give a cor-
rect depiction of AI research, the fact that the imitation game is not 
the primary focus of the field does not weaken this article’s argument. 
This is because I understand and discuss the simulative paradigm as 
being predicated not uniquely on a striving to replicate the human in 
the machine, or the machine in the human, but in fact as an effort to 
make computation more akin to the onto-epistemological dimension 
of the lived and the living, upon which the human is arguably predi-
cated.
Footnote 3 (continued)
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assumption that, at best, smart machines can only be said 
to simulate human thought, or to simulate the onto-episte-
mological conditions upon which human thought is predi-
cated. My aim here is to show that, by taking some distance 
from the simulative paradigm, it is possible to challenge 
the all-enframing cognitivism inherent in the hope, and the 
effort, of automating thought. However, rather than discard-
ing computational automation and its potential for thinking 
altogether, I also intend to demonstrate that it may be pos-
sible to open an autonomous onto-epistemological prospect 
for automated machine thought by freeing the latter from the 
expectation that automation is just an attempt at simulation, 
whether of human cognition, or of life and lived experience.
2  Calculative activities
The issue of novel thought in computation can be articulated 
in many ways. An obvious and important field of reference 
for this problem is the area of study that goes by the name 
of ‘computational creativity’. Efforts in the field see the con-
tributions made by artificial intelligence, cognitive science, 
psychology, philosophy and the arts towards exploring the 
possibility of artificially modelling and replicating creative 
behaviour using the mechanical means of computation. This 
heterogeneous field is relatively young, but it has already 
achieved some surprising results.5 As often happens in AI 
research, this kind of experimentation has a mutual benefit: 
by trying to replicate human cognitive function in machines, 
it becomes possible to understand better what that function 
in the human is in the first place. So, by creating models of 
the multifaceted and protean qualities of human creativity, 
light is shed on the origin and the development of creative 
behaviour, regardless of whether that behaviour is natural 
or artificial.
It would be unfair to characterise computational creativity 
as being uniquely concerned with simulating human creativ-
ity in machines. As a matter of fact, the field considers the 
nature of creativity and of creativity involving computational 
activity at large.6 At the same time, however, it should be 
noted that debates in this area of research tend to praise 
capacities such as insight, inspiration, intuition, ingenuity, 
interest, improvisation, interpretation or even intelligence 
itself, all of which are valued features of the creative human 
mind. In this respect, I would then say that, by addressing 
novel thought in computation through the parameters of 
computational creativity, or even creativity in general, there 
is a risk of retaining simulation as an implicit measure for 
success.7 Seen in these terms, machines would be deemed 
to be capable of generating novelty insofar as they are rec-
ognised as doing something that one would characterise as 
creative if humans were doing it. It could be said that this 
mode of enquiry pursues computing machines that might be 
less computer-like: machines that might surprise us by doing 
what machines may not be likely to do successfully, such as 
crafting a moving speech, improvising jazz, or composing 
a beautiful dance. I believe, therefore, that what tends to be 
searched for in these practices is a type of thought process 
and of computational processing that is less automatic and 
less mechanical. In other words, one that resists or circum-
vents the stubborn automatism of logical machines.
I acknowledge the importance of this type of work, and 
I recognise that I am painting a picture of a varied area and 
community of research in broad brushstrokes. However, I 
must also clarify that my question about novel thought in 
computation is not based on the successes and failures of the 
field of computational creativity. I want to take a different 
route here to that which computational creativity might be 
seen to adopt, for I will not linger on the capacity of comput-
ers to surprise us, or to do what they are not supposed to do. 
On the contrary, I wish to consider machines that do exactly 
what they are supposed to do. I want to engage with the 
question: can computing machines be generative of novelty 
in ways that are profoundly alien to humans, because they 
are so inherently computational?
In order to develop this question, one must address tradi-
tional automated computational tasks, such as, for instance, 
prediction and decision-making. Both prediction and deci-
sion-making can be understood as typically calculative 
5 Colton, López de Mántaras and Stock comment that “compu-
tational creativity as a discipline has come of age. This maturity is 
evident in the amount of activity related to computational creativity 
in recent years; in the sophistication of the creative software we are 
building; in the cultural value of artifacts being produced by our soft-
ware; and most importantly, in the consensus we are finding on gen-
eral issues on computational creativity” (2009, 12). A survey of key 
research issues in the field is given in Cardoso et al. (2009).
6 It should be noted that “[…] simulating thought processes in only 
one of [computational creativity’s] aims” (Colton et al. 2009, 14). See 
also Colton and Wiggins, who characterise computational creativity 
as a “subfield of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research […] where we 
build and work with computational systems that can create artefacts 
and ideas” (2012, 21). This definition “does not rule out situations 
7 Interestingly, Turing tests for creative computing are popular and 
common in the field, although they are contested (see Colton and 
Wiggins 2012). The Neukom Institute for Computational Science 
at Dartmouth College (USA), for instance, is sponsoring the Turing 
Tests in the Creative Arts. This is a competition that, in its 2017 edi-
tion, encourages the creation of software able to: (1) write a short 
story; (2) compose sonnets; (3) accompany a human musician in a 
classical duet or jazz jam; (4) generate a digital dance partner for a 
human dancer. These four outcomes must be indistinguishable from 
those resulting from human effort. At the time of writing, the 2017 
competition has just begun.
where systems are deemed to be creative even though they behave in 
wholly different ways, and to different ends, from people” (ivi).
Footnote 6 (continued)
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activities. As such, they are activities that can be effectively 
mechanised via algorithmic means. For instance, it is pos-
sible to argue that it was better predictions that allowed the 
IBM supercomputer Deep Blue to beat chess grandmaster 
Garry Kasparov in their historic match in 1997. Both play-
ers were trying to predict each other’s moves. They were 
both calculating the consequences of changing the posi-
tions of the pieces on the board, and considering what their 
adversary would do next. Deep Blue won through the sheer 
brute force of its heuristics: it was able to evaluate two hun-
dred million positions per second. It won because it pre-
dicted better, and it predicted better because it calculated 
faster and on a grander scale than a stressed-out Kasparov, 
whose thoughts, legend has it, were clouded by paranoia 
and suspicion.8 Algorithmic decision-making also prom-
ises similarly successful outcomes, and just like prediction, 
decision-making is also calculative when it is carried out via 
computational means. Operational decisions, such as what 
trades to make, are calculatory staples of today’s financial 
markets. It is not by following gut feelings that the quantita-
tive finance models of automated algorithmic trading answer 
the question ‘Should I buy this stock or not?’ Instead, what 
one finds there is the deterministic operation of buying and 
selling securities on the market automatically, according to 
some pre-programmed strategy. This is decision-making on 
steroids, executing millions of orders and scanning multiple 
markets in fractions of seconds.9
It is easy to call both the supercomputer Deep Blue and 
the high-frequency trading algorithms ‘smart’. Indeed, it is 
also tempting to call these machines “smarter than us”, since 
“once computers achieve something at human level, they 
typically achieve it at a much higher level soon thereafter” 
(Armstrong 2014, 43). One might find it more difficult, how-
ever, to associate their smartness, and their ability to out-
smart us, with the production of a form of epistemic novelty. 
Both the predictions of the supercomputer Deep Blue and 
the decisions of high-frequency trading (HFT) algorithms 
exemplify what computers do best: given certain premises, 
and by following certain instructions, they achieve certain 
goals. Or, to put it in more anthropomorphic terms, this 
is a case of selecting possible actions in order to steer the 
future towards a desired outcome. Both examples, then, are 
instances of an operational type of smartness that goes by 
the name of instrumental rationality, and which is, as Max 
Weber described in his study of industrial rationalisation, 
“determined by expectations as to the behaviour of objects 
in the environment and of other human beings” (1978, 24). 
These expectations “are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for 
the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and cal-
culated ends” (ivi).
Of course, the affinity between calculating machines and 
instrumentally rational action, which “accepts itself simply 
as a tool” (Horkheimer 2012, vii), has been noted before. 
I am not going to reiterate the long history of the critical 
analogy between them here.10 What I want to ask, rather, is 
whether this instrumentality can ever be understood in terms 
of the creation of novel thought. Arguably, instrumental 
reasoning is not inherently opposed to novelty. The instru-
mentality of reason is often exemplified, according to the 
Frankfurt School interpretation, by the cunning of Odysseus, 
who tied himself tightly to the mast of his ship in order to 
hear the beautiful song of the sirens whilst also avoiding the 
danger of steering the boat off its course (see Horkheimer 
and Adorno 1972). We know the myth, and what it means for 
us moderns who have been betrayed by (or, conversely, have 
betrayed) the Enlightenment, as Adorno and Horkheimer 
argued. However, there is nothing in this story that prevents 
us from believing that Odysseus’ cost effective and efficient 
expedient is not a clever, inventive, although still perverse, 
form of novel problem-solving. The possibility of novelty 
within instrumentality would thus seem to be accepted when 
the instrumental rational agent is a human one.
Machine instrumentality is, however, different, and it is 
judged differently. The crux of this difference, I would claim, 
lies in the fundamental disparity between machines on the 
one hand, and life, the lived and the living on the other. 
In order to explain this central claim in my argument, it is 
first necessary to consider the question of novel thought in 
computation vis-à-vis an old hope and an old worry, both 
8 These events, and Kasparov’s feelings about them, are narrated in 
the 2003 documentary Game Over: Kasparov and the Machine by 
Vikram Jayanti. For the story of the match from the perspective of 
IBM and Deep Blue’s creators, see Hsu (2002). The significance of 
Deep Blue’s success for artificial intelligence is discussed in Morris 
(1997). In 2016, and nearly 20 years after the historic Deep Blue ver-
sus Kasparov chess match, AlphaGo, an AI developed by Google’s 
AI company DeepMind, beat the champion human player Lee Sedol 
at a game of Go. Interestingly, DeepMind is said to describe AlphaGo 
as “more useful” than the Deep Blue computer that defeated Kasp-
arov, insofar as this new AI does not consider all solutions to a prob-
lem, but instead “decide[s] between a few top scenarios” (Aron 2016, 
6).
9 For an investigation of automated trading techniques from the soci-
ological perspective of science and technology study, see MacKenzie 
(2016). The rise of AI trading is also recounted in the work of finan-
cial journalists Scott Patterson (2012) and Michael Lewis (2014).
10 Nonetheless, it is necessary to mention that the considerations of 
this affinity develop from a long tradition of critical enquiry about 
technology as a form of instrumental rationality. The Frankfurt 
School, most famously, addressed the role that technology plays in 
the modernising processes and organisation principles of society, 
as well as the manner in which technological rationalisation orients 
social formations and the meaning of culture (see Horkheimer 2012, 
2013; Horkheimer and Adorno 1972). Beyond critical theory, the 
philosophy of AI itself recognises, albeit by a way of rather different 
perspective, that smart machines can be intelligent in a specifically 
instrumental sense (see, for instance, Bostrom 2014).
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of which pertain to the possibility of mechanising thought, 
or in other words, to the prospect of making thinking proce-
dural, inferential, and indeed both automatic and automated.
3  The automation of thought: Leibniz 
and Turing
A good starting point from which to address the expectations 
that have been invested (philosophically, scientifically and 
culturally) in the automation of thought can be offered by 
looking at the long-standing dream of mathesis universalis. 
Despite the erudition implied by the Greek-Latin origin of 
the expression, the actual meaning of mathesis universalis 
is not straightforward. For the sake of brevity, let us say that 
its most direct definition is that of a universal mathematical 
science. Aspirations towards such a universal mathemati-
cal science have been inherited from the ancient world, and 
became popular amongst the early modern philosophers of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.11 Notably, they were 
also shared by Descartes, who described mathesis universa-
lis as “a general science which explains all the points that 
can be raised concerning order and measure irrespective of 
the subject matter” (Descartes 1985, 19). It is, however, the 
Baroque polymath par excellence, Leibniz, whom I wish 
to address here, for Leibniz’s philosophy will allow me to 
establish a conceptual link between mathesis universalis, the 
automation of thought and computing machines. Establish-
ing this link is, in turn, important for the overall develop-
ment of my argument about novelty qua the onto-epistemo-
logical autonomy of algorithmic automation. In this section, 
I will thus read Leibniz’s philosophical attempt to mecha-
nise thought in parallel with Turing’s technical endeavour 
to show how thinking is already mechanical. I will do so in 
order to sketch a brief genealogy of the computationalist 
goal of mechanising the mind. As I have claimed above, this 
goal can be read in parallel with technoscientific concerns 
about simulation. By showing how they represent an endur-
ing dream (and an equally enduring worry) in technoculture, 
I can slowly introduce my argument that questions about the 
automation of thought imply questions about the automa-
tion of being, and that they thus lead us to philosophically 
confront the onto-epistemological disparity between life and 
mechanism.
In Leibniz, mathesis universalis still concerns a general 
framework of calculation. Nonetheless, the applications and 
implications of this general calculative framework extend 
much further than Cartesian issues of order and meas-
ure. With Leibniz, mathesis universalis is less a general 
mathematical science than a generalisation of the rules of 
thought itself. The project of mathesis universalis, in other 
words, becomes the project of a universal science of reason-
ing, which is in turn to be supported by the construction 
of what Leibniz called a characteristica universalis. This 
characteristica universalis is an abstract symbolism that, 
according to Leibniz’s invention, would have unambigu-
ously represented all that can be thought and expressed (see 
Leibniz 1989). Such a universal character, which in effect 
amounted to a universal conceptual language, was in turn to 
be supported by the calculus ratiocinator: a purely rational 
and ideal grammar that, for Leibniz, would have worked 
as a proper inference engine. Regrettably, Leibniz never 
described his project for a mathesis universalis in detail. 
His attempt can nonetheless be summarised in three steps: 
(1) to create a compendium of all human knowledge; (2) to 
select appropriate symbols to express this compendium; (3) 
to reduce rules of deduction to these symbols. By doing so, 
Leibniz aimed to demonstrate that it is possible to operate 
with concepts in a strictly formal manner. That is to say, that 
it was possible to find the general, symbolic rules for valid 
reasoning, and that once we had these rules, we would have 
the mechanism for never erring in our thinking. “Calcule-
mus”: let us calculate! In Leibniz’s famous rationalist exhor-
tation (see Leibniz 1951, 51), the valid reasoning which cal-
culation expresses is the key to intellectual discovery, as well 
as the best tool we have for solving human disputes.
Leibniz himself might never have accomplished his plan 
for a mathesis universalis, yet a Leibnizian faith in calcula-
tion became decisive for twentieth-century interpretations 
of a universal formal science of reasoning, which have in 
turn influenced modern developments of mathematical logic. 
In this respect, it is also impossible to ignore the influence 
that Leibniz’s dream of universal symbolic calculation has 
exerted upon the development of contemporary computing. 
It is useful here to refer directly to the establishment of the 
notion of computability by, once again, the mathematical 
genius of Alan Turing. More than a decade before he asked 
whether machines could think, Turing took on a press-
ing problem in mathematical logic: the decision problem 
(also known as Entscheidungsproblem). This problem was 
phrased by the most prominent mathematician of the time, 
David Hilbert, in terms of a question that asked whether a 
universal and definite method to decide whether a proposi-
tion is provable could be conclusively envisaged. In his 1936 
paper ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem’, Turing set out to answer Hilbert 
by addressing the decision problem from the perspective of 
computability, and by giving a precise definition of ‘method’ 
via that perspective. By answering in the negative to Hil-
bert’s question (that is, by proving that certain functions 
cannot be computed), and thereby confirming Kurt Gödel’s 
earlier results on undecidability in axiomatic systems (see 
11 Crapulli (1969) discusses the sixteenth-century development of the 
idea of mathesis universalis.
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Gödel 2004), Turing then also proposed a specific method of 
computation that is said to have defined our current concep-
tion of mechanical calculation.
In Turing’s 1936 formalisation of the notion of comput-
ability, to compute is to discretise a task into the algorithmic 
form. This means turning it into a rule-governed activity 
that can be addressed as a sequential succession of finite 
steps. In this sense, Turing’s algorithmic method of compu-
tation expresses an automatic principle of deductive infer-
ence, which is considered universal insofar as it is capable of 
computing anything that can, in principle, be computed via 
the sequential succession of finite steps of an algorithm. The 
postulation of this universal method of computation is one 
of Turing’s most influential achievements; an achievement 
that justifies the view that he ‘invented’ modern comput-
ers.12 This characteristic of universality, I would argue, is 
also quite important from the point of view of the connection 
that I am making here between calculation and the automa-
tion of thought.
A universal calculative theory of reasoning, such as Leib-
niz’s mathesis universalis, stands as an attempt to construct 
what I would call a machine of thought, and to do so by 
trying to give thinking an inferential, normative and pro-
cedural form. This calculative enterprise searches for an 
ordering technique to mechanically control and reproduce 
the structure of thinking procedures. Fast forward a couple 
of centuries, and one can note that the algorithmic method 
of calculation, which Turing established, is also predicated 
upon computation as a formalisation of ‘valid reasoning’, 
according to which a finite set of instructions accounts for 
the full operationality and predictability of a mechanical sys-
tem. In this respect, Turing’s algorithmic method of calcula-
tion becomes the technique proper to axiomatic reasoning: 
that is, reasoning that is fully automated insofar as it needs 
nothing but itself in order to prove its validity.
In proposing the algorithmic method of computation, 
Turing modelled the action of his then-hypothetical ‘com-
puting machine’ on what he believed to be the discrete-state 
operations of a human mind engaged in crunching num-
bers.13 So, whilst Leibniz proposed a machine of thought, 
Turing treated thought as if its behaviour was already simi-
lar to that of a machine. The character of universality is 
important in both cases. If calculation is valid reasoning (and 
both Leibniz and Turing believed it is), and if valid reason-
ing always aims to be universal (again, Leibniz and Turing 
believed this to be the case), then a valid calculative method 
is one that tries to be as general as possible. To be universal 
is thus to be general, but also, and most importantly, to be 
abstract. This is, in my view, a crucial point. Despite the dif-
ferences between Leibniz’s and Turing’s respective projects 
(and there are plenty of differences between them), the Leib-
nizian faith in calculation and Turing’s algorithmic method 
of computation share a confidence in abstraction, which is 
taken to be the safest ground for the operability of calcula-
tion. In this sense, aspirations to mechanise thought, or to 
show that thought could already be mechanical, are equally 
predicated upon the assumption that both proof and func-
tion can be placed outside of space and time, and outside of 
context and content.
The universal strength of mechanical calculation capital-
ises upon the detachment of the mechanical procedure from 
the particular; a detachment that is in turn instrumentalised 
into procedures to best resolve disputes, as Leibniz hoped, 
or to obtain an output from an input, as Turing expected. 
This instrumentalisation of abstraction is a key feature of 
the inferential and rule-based character of computational 
systems. For every calculating process, the computational 
system engages, and then re-engages again, with the gen-
eral problem of determining consequences from a handful 
of symbolised premises. The automation of thought thrives 
on this procedural determinism of rules of inference: it is its 
complete determination that makes a machine (of thought, 
as of anything else) a machine.
4  The clash between life and mechanism
Let us linger, if only briefly, on this determinism, for doing 
so will allow us to consider the automation of thought in 
relation to my previous remarks about machine instru-
mentality, and about the fact that the latter is judged dif-
ferently when it comes to the question of novel thought in 
computation.
For Leibniz, the determinism of calculation is total. If 
Leibniz believed that it is possible to mechanise the rules 
of thought into a procedure of automatic inference, this is 
because nature itself, for Leibniz, is fundamentally rational, 
or governed by a determinist logic. I am referring here to the 
Leibnizian formulation of a principle of sufficient reason, 
which postulates that everything has a cause or a reason for 
being what it is. It is exactly because the principle of suf-
ficient reason has both logical and ontological validity that 
it is also possible to address Leibniz’s dream of automating 
thought from the standpoint of his argument for the sufficient 
rationality of the real. It can in fact be argued that the Leib-
nizian invocation of calculation is grounded upon what he 
believed to be the ‘pre-programming’ of reality, a belief that 
is implicit in the principle of sufficient reason. That principle 
requires that whatever occurs is, as Leibniz himself put it, 
12 I have discussed at length Turing’s 1936 paper ‘On Computable 
Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem’ in Fazi 
(2016).
13 “We may compare a man in the process of computing a real num-
ber to a machine which is only capable of a finite number of condi-
tions” (Turing 1936, 231).
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“certain and determined beforehand” (1985, 151). In other 
words, it is possible to say that Leibniz’s epistemological 
project is substantiated by a metaphysical principle.
Turing’s position on ontological determinism is more 
difficult to reconstruct, partly because, despite having pro-
foundly influenced philosophy, Turing was primarily a math-
ematician with explicitly logical, rather than ontological 
concerns. I acknowledge this, of course, yet I also wish to 
highlight that computation, via Turing’s work, is formal-
ised into an axiomatic process of showing how a conclusion 
necessarily follows from a set of premises. In my view, this 
deterministic activity of pinning down chains of reasoning 
into a fixed formal structure can be said to be an attempt to 
predicate deductive thought exclusively on its extra-empir-
ical terms. On my reading of Turing’s work, then, the epis-
temological leaks into the ontological, or their boundaries 
become somewhat permeable.
One can see the effect of this permeability in the com-
putational theory of mind, which emerged in the second 
half of the twentieth century, partly as a consequence of 
the implicit links that Turing made between calculation and 
cognition. According to computationalist theories in cogni-
tive science, “intelligent behavior is causally explained by 
computations performed by the agent’s cognitive system (or 
brain)” (Piccinini 2009, 515). Logos (i.e. software) informs 
matter (i.e. hardware), then, or rather bypasses matter alto-
gether to directly lead behaviour. In any case, the thin line 
between issues of knowledge and issues of reality blurs 
frequently.14 I would further comment that this also seems 
to be the case amongst certain contemporary versions of 
information theory, such as that proposed by the mathema-
tician Gregory Chaitin, who takes both Leibniz and Turing 
as guiding figures for his own work.15 For Chaitin, and for 
the advocates of what is known as ‘digital philosophy’ or 
‘digital physics’, “all is algorithm” (Chaitin 2007, 235): the 
determinism of algorithms is not just a metaphor used to 
explain the workings of nature and the mind; rather, this 
determinism amounts to how reality actually is and how it 
actually operates.
It is crucial to stress that past and present projects for 
the automation of thought do not concern only epistemol-
ogy, but involve an ontological prospect too; that questions 
about the automation of thought, in other words, also con-
cern questions about the automation of being. Acknowledg-
ing this point brings to the fore an as yet unresolved issue in 
philosophy: namely, the relation between thought and being, 
and the ways in which that relation might be established, or 
simply recounted, via universalising tools such as abstrac-
tion. Moreover, acknowledging this issue also highlights 
something important about the question of novel thought in 
computation. I have discussed how machine thought adheres 
to the deterministic and deductive rules of computational 
formalisation. In this respect, if computation seems inca-
pable of producing novelty, this is because algorithmic for-
malisation does not construct any knowledge, but instead 
only breaks it down into a finite and discrete manipulation 
of symbols and instructions. However, recognising that 
questions about the automation of thought involve ques-
tions about the automation of being also helps us to con-
sider here that views concerning the absence of novelty in 
computation are not only, or are not uniquely, based on the 
fact that, in machines, everything is pre-programmed. As a 
matter of fact, there exist (and there have existed for some 
time) machine programs that possess a degree of complexity 
sufficient enough to allow them to ‘learn’ to modify their 
behaviour and perform operations without explicit instruc-
tions.16 What I wish to argue, then, is that the popular belief 
about the impossibility of novelty in computation finds its 
justification in the observation that to compute is to formally 
abstract, and thus to generalise and reduce into a logical and 
deterministic relation the dynamism of life and of thought 
that comes from lived experience. To put this otherwise: my 
contention here is that the belief about the impossibility of 
novelty in computation could be said to be a consequence, 
or at least to reflect, the fundamental ontological disparity 
between machines on the one hand, and the non-mechanical 
on the other.
This is an ontological disparity that is also mirrored in the 
(ontological, as well as epistemological) difference between 
automated and lived thought. The mechanical thought asso-
ciated with computation involves, inevitably, abstracting 
from life, from sensation, from experience itself; in other 
words, from those grounds upon which, it is said, every-
thing that could account for genuine epistemic as well as 
ontological production might arise. Contra formalism and 
the formalisation of thought, thinking processes that are 
immanent to lived experience are instead always particular 
because they are instantiated in spatiotemporal and affective 
dynamics. As such, they can only be reduced to their logical 
representation by way of the approximation and generalisa-
tion of those dynamics. These approximations and gener-
alisations are precisely what twentieth-century criticisms of 
14 For Putnam (1967), for instance, mental states are functional 
states, and thus detachable from the ‘hardware’ of the brain. On the 
other hand, in the materialist version of computationalism advanced 
by Paul and Patricia Churchland, there is only hardware, and minds 
are brains, which are computing. See Churchland and Churchland 
(1990), Churchland and Sejnowski (1992).
15 See Chaitin (2005).
16 The present enthusiasm about the AI technique known as ‘machine 
learning’ concerns precisely this capability. This enthusiasm is mani-
fest in Domingos (2015), who argues that “the quest for the ultimate 
learning machine will remake our world”. I will return to the case of 
machine learning in the last section of this article.
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instrumental reason, as well as wider philosophical argu-
ments that emphasise the singularity and incommensurabil-
ity of the lived, warned against. They warned that a thinking 
process that detaches itself from the particular is totalis-
ing, and thus dangerous, for “the concept of rationality that 
underlies our contemporary industrial culture […] contain[s] 
defects that vitiate it essentially” (Horkheimer 2013, vii), 
and “the rule of freedom” that is instantiated by this concept, 
“once brought to pass, necessarily turns into its opposite: the 
automatizing of society and human behaviour” (Horkheimer 
2012, ix–x).
Moreover, on this view, a thinking process that detaches 
itself from the particular is also somewhat ontologically 
‘inferior’. This inferiority is due to the fact that the thinking 
associated with computing involves, once again, a structur-
ing of formal relations, in which there is no room for the 
generative potential of life, the living and the lived. Post-
structuralist, existentialist and phenomenological positions 
in philosophy have, in this respect, equally led the charge 
against the prospect of reducing the infinity and variability 
of lived thought to the finitude of an automated procedure. 
The eccentricities of thought that comes from Being or 
beings are thus vindicated against functionalism, operation-
alisation, universalism, instrumentalisation, and anything 
that wants to obstruct the ontological dynamic of thinking 
or entrap it within the programmable, abstracted and pre-
defined structure.
From this perspective, the automation of thought, or its 
full mechanisation, is not the dream that Leibniz dreamt, but 
in fact a nightmare. This nightmare finds its latest expression 
in some of the ways in which automation is culturally per-
ceived today as posing a sort of existential threat to society. 
Many cultural media outlets have attested to this. From the 
tabloid to the scientific journal via the glossy coffee table 
spread, the message that is broadcasted is clear: the robots 
are out to get us. In my view, and following from what I have 
discussed so far, the threat that is culturally perceived to be 
posed by automation must be understood not only in terms 
of a collective fear for people’s existence or survival. By say-
ing this, of course, I am not underestimating real concerns 
about unemployment caused by technology, or the faster and 
faster pace at which artificial intelligence is developing.17 I 
believe, however, that whenever one asks questions such as, 
for instance, whether machines will threaten our jobs, one is 
not just asking about the economic implications of automa-
tion. What is also implicitly already assessed is our relation 
to mechanical procedures, and thus the extent to which these 
mechanical procedures exist in opposition to what is not, and 
might never be, mechanised. The problem of automation is 
existential, then, insofar as it involves recognising an onto-
logical clash between life and mechanism. It concerns the 
ways in which machines, thought and mechanical thought 
exist, endure or simply are.
5  Alien thought
It is only at this point in the discussion that I can fully 
advance the view that philosophical, scientific and cultural 
withdrawals into a simulative paradigm mirror a generalised 
technical, scientific and cultural suspicion that an intelligent 
automatism might not in fact be so special, insofar as it is a 
reduction, an approximation, or at best just a simulation of 
what life (to be understood both as the living and the lived) 
will never be, i.e. automatic. I can finally fully advance this 
claim because I have now demonstrated that this suspicion 
taps into long-standing ontological and epistemological 
issues about the nature of thought and its relation to lived 
experience. It is also at this point in the discussion, however, 
that it is necessary to mention that a preoccupation with an 
onto-epistemological disparity between machines and life 
does not only characterise philosophy and critical theory, 
but belongs to computer science too. In recent decades, the 
classical algorithmic model of computation (i.e. Turing’s 
model) has been challenged by interactive, embodied and 
situated conceptualisations of the computing machine, 
which aim to complement the algorithmic rule with envi-
ronmental inputs, so as to bring the physicality and social-
ity of the ‘real world’ (which is always leaning towards the 
behavioural richness of living and lived experience) into its 
computational representation.
In this respect, it could be said that attempts to mecha-
nise the mind have given rise to attempts to humanise the 
machine. This reflects the necessities of contemporary com-
puting, which has to interact with and respond to the world 
at an unprecedented scale and speed. For me, however, there 
is more involved at a conceptual level. Twenty-first century 
society is not only witnessing attempts to make machines 
more human or more social, but also attempts to make them 
akin to the generative dimension of lived existence upon 
which human and social conditions are predicated. So, for 
instance, from an aesthetic and sociocultural perspective, 
computational systems are made akin to matter and life 
by associating them with empirical variability, or with the 
affective immanence of sensation. Moreover, within com-
puter science itself, algorithms have been programmed to 
adapt, mutate and evolve like living organisms, and ‘reflex-
ivity’ and ‘emergence’ are not only contemporary key words 
in the natural sciences, but in computing too.
This is another side of understanding computation as 
simulation. Although this other side can also be seen as 
17 Some of these concerns are discussed in Brynjolfsson and McA-
fee (2011), Frey and Osborne (2013), Carr (2015), Ford (2015) and 
Mason (2015).
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a move away from the computationalism of much cogni-
tive science (insofar as what it is pursued is not, strictly 
speaking, a computational explanation of a phenomenon), I 
believe that the contemporary debate concerning this topic 
remains, nonetheless, stuck in a computational metaphor of 
some kind. Just as the mechanisation of the mind and the 
humanisation of the machine go together, the counterpart to 
the naturalisation of machines can be said to be the mecha-
nisation of nature. What one finds here, of course, is not 
the clockwork mechanistic universe of Newton, but rather 
the dynamic structuralism of ants, bird flocks and neurons, 
which are all said to compute, or to do something similar to 
computation, insofar as they transmit and process informa-
tion whilst organising themselves from simple procedures 
all the way up to complex behaviour. In this scenario, it is 
difficult to determine what simulates what, or who simulates 
whom. The walls of Searle’s Chinese room have come down 
to encompass nature itself.18
When they are looked at from this perspective, conflict-
ing positions such as philosophical criticisms of the mecha-
nisation of thought on the one hand, and technoscientific 
attempts to enlarge the domain of computability to include 
the human and the natural on the other, appear to have a 
common problem and a common target: formalism itself. 
The simulative paradigm reinforces this attack by aiming 
to intervene within formalisation: humanising it, I would 
argue, but also naturalising it. These operations, I would also 
claim, can be addressed as counterparts of similar simulative 
endeavours, which point, however paradoxically, not away 
from formalisation but towards it: for machines that can be 
humanised, there are minds that can be mechanised, and if a 
computer can do what nature does it is because nature, some 
say, is already computing.19
In this scenario, whatever direction we choose (away 
or towards formalisation) we are still stuck in an imitation 
game. And yet, once it is recognised that this entrapment is 
predicated upon a striving towards either making formal-
ism more empirical, or towards making the empirical more 
formal, it becomes possible to envisage a way out of this 
jam. The exit that I propose concerns accepting the disparity 
between machines and life, and in fact involves radicalis-
ing this disparity by accepting computational formalisation 
in its distinct specificity. I am arguing that computation’s 
epistemic productions should be assessed vis-à-vis the log-
ico-quantitative character of those formalisms that under-
pin computing. This involves engaging with the epistemic 
contributions of computational formalisation by allowing 
automated modes of thought to operate independently of 
any aspirations towards replicating human cognitive facul-
ties, and of the dimension of lived experience upon which 
these human cognitive faculties are ontologically predicated. 
Similarly, however, to engage with the epistemic contribu-
tions of computational formalisation also involves recognis-
ing that the automated modes of thought that are engendered 
by computation, precisely because they are formalised and 
formalising, propose a different order of intelligibility. This 
order of intelligibility corresponds to a machine ontology 
that cannot be simply dismissed as reductive, precisely 
because moving away from the simulative paradigm means 
that the assumption that the machine only represents humans 
has been invalidated.
My point is that if we, as a society, are to engage with 
computation’s possibility of producing forms or modes of 
thought, then we need to start by acknowledging this other 
order of intelligibility, together with the way in which the 
computational procedure stands alongside the living organ-
ism, the physical object, and also the mathematical idea, as a 
distinct entity. By saying this I am not, of course, advocating 
a Platonism of sorts, because what I wish to look at are com-
putational processes in their actuality, as opposed to viewing 
them in purely ideal terms. Similarly, I am not advocating 
the regression into a mind and body dualism. Instead, what I 
am supporting is the philosophical challenge of understand-
ing the legitimacy of the processual and mechanical nature 
of this distinct entity, i.e. the computational procedure. This 
is a challenge that cannot be subsumed under the affirma-
tion of the ontological superiority of life or machines over 
one another.
Importantly, moving beyond the simulative paradigm 
would allow us to extend the technocultural debate about 
computational automation from popular tales of intelligent 
machines that will one day outsmart us to questions about 
thinking per se. In this respect, moving beyond the simula-
tive paradigm would also allow us to recast the metaphysi-
cal question of the nature of thought, precisely because the 
computational turn, and the present expansion of computa-
tional automation, with its epistemological consequences, 
have brought that question to the fore again. In my view, 
recasting the question of the nature of thinking vis-à-vis 
computational automation means opening up new avenues 
of speculation, so as to take seriously the possibility that 
19 I am referring here to pancomputationalist positions in ‘digital 
physics’ and ‘digital philosophy’ (see Fredkin 2003), but also to het-
erogeneous standpoints in what is known as ‘natural computing’ (see 
De Castro 2006; Shasha and Lazere 2010).
18 In mentioning the ‘Chinese room’, I am referring to John Searle’s 
famous argument against the computationalist presumptions of what 
Searle calls ‘strong AI’. Searle (1980) argues that to compute is not 
the same thing as to understand or to behold any kind of conscious-
ness. A program might make a computer behave in a way that demon-
strates a degree of human-level intelligence, for instance, by making 
it speak Chinese. However, the machine does not have any under-
standing or consciousness of the faculty of speaking Chinese: it is 
only processing symbols. Syntax, in other words, does not account for 
semantics. For Searle, then, computers only simulate (human) cogni-
tion.
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computational processes of decision-making and prediction 
might constitute a novel modality of thought: not despite 
the deterministic, deductive, axiomatic, procedural and 
operational character of these processes, but rather because 
of it. IBM super computer Deep Blue did not beat Kasp-
arov because it thought like him. Quite the opposite: it won 
because it thought in a manner that was completely different 
to the way in which he thought, and indeed from the ways in 
which we all think. Equally, the decision-making of high-
frequency trading performs on a different epistemic scale. 
So, whilst I agree that formalisation, and also computation 
itself, might obscure what is exciting and creative about rea-
soning in humans, I would equally say that the simulative 
paradigm obscures what is exciting and potentially creative 
in a mode of reasoning that is purely computational, and 
which is, insofar as it is purely computational, dramatically 
alien to us.
The case of machine learning can help me to explain this 
claim. I mentioned this AI technique earlier in this essay.20 
Here I can add that machine learning is a type of artificial 
intelligence that endows computers with the capacity to learn 
from large data sets. This technique is much talked about 
today, as it lies at the basis of many promising developments. 
Along with the excitement, however, comes a caveat. It is 
often said that machine learning is a ‘black box’. In other 
words, it is stressed that, although these algorithms have a 
great impact upon society, they cannot be held accountable 
for the consequences of this impact because they are pro-
prietary and thus closed to public scrutiny.21 Of course, I 
agree that deciphering the black boxes of machine learning 
is becoming more and more urgent, because their influence 
upon our world is becoming greater and greater each day. 
The point that I would like to consider here, however, is that 
machine learning is also a black box in another, more techni-
cal, sense. Because they are modelled to act as deep neural 
nets, these techniques are often very opaque, or indeed illeg-
ible, because they are so complex that they cannot even be 
understood by the programmers that created them. Machine 
learning works, but we do not fully understand how.
The claim that ‘we do not know how they work’ is, for 
me, profoundly interesting insofar as it might allow us to 
say that, de facto, machine learning is making a crack in 
the simulative paradigm, which has been looming over AI 
research since Turing’s imitation game in 1950. Whilst, to 
an extent, we can say these algorithms ‘learn’ because they 
improve themselves based on their exposure to stimuli, in 
reality we cannot judge this improvement, or this supposed 
learning, according to parameters of simulated behaviour, 
precisely because we cannot really tell what is going on.
It is at this point, exactly when facing the prospect of this 
alien thought, that I find that asking ‘Can a machine think?’ 
might be an ambiguous, and yet by no means meaningless 
operation.22 As discussed in the opening section of this arti-
cle, Turing recognised the poignancy of this question, but he 
also believed that the question risked giving rise to unpro-
ductive and frustrating attempts to define ‘machines’ and 
‘thought’. However, if the question of whether a machine 
can think is not addressed from a simulative perspective, it 
becomes possible to realise that it is in fact extremely impor-
tant to respond to the need to define, and to keep defining, 
the terms ‘machine’ and ‘thought’. What I propose to address 
here is indeed not just any type of thought, but a very special 
and peculiar one. This is a mode or form of thought that 
is procedural, instrumental and operational, and one that is 
also always quantifying, rationalising and discretising. The 
machine that is the subject of this investigation is also not just 
any machine, and Turing himself recognised this when he 
stated that the “machines concerned in the [imitation] game” 
(1950, 435) are “digital computers” (ibid., 436), which are in 
fact “discrete state machines” (ibid., 439). First and foremost, 
Turing’s digital computers are machines that are arithmetic, 
highly formalised and formalising, and which pertain more 
to the laws of abstraction than to the laws of matter and life. 
As such, they are also machines that can be universal, for all 
the good and bad that this universalism implies.
Inevitably, then, conceptions of novelty must also be 
reframed as specific to these discrete machines. The aim of 
this article was to show that the possibility of novel thought 
in computation becomes specific to what algorithmic auto-
mation is and does. Just as the ‘machine thought’ that I have 
been concerned with is unique to the discrete and formal 
operations of computation, so the ‘novelty’ in computation 
that I am pointing towards is epitomised by the onto-epis-
temological specificity of these operations. For example, if 
we look for ingenuity and intuition as conditions for novelty, 
we might be disappointed and never find them in the dis-
crete algorithmic operationality of machine thought, for the 
same reason that a computer can easily win a chess game or 
even bring about a ‘flash crash’ of the market, and yet still 
cannot pass the Turing test. However, having stepped out-
side the simulative paradigm, the question ‘Can a machine 
think anything new?’ can eventually be reformulated so as to 
20 See note 16.
21 Frank Pasquale has eloquently described contemporary society’s 
current “gaps in knowledge” about algorithmic technologies, and 
argued for a “more intelligible social order” (2016, 2–3).
22 The AI pioneer Joseph Weizenbaum also talked of AI as ‘alien’, 
although in a different context to my own argument. He wrote: “No 
other organism, and certainly no computer, can be made to confront 
genuine human problems in human terms. And, since the domain of 
intelligence is, except for a small set of formal problems, determined 
by man’s humanity, every other intelligence, however great, must nec-
essarily be alien to the human domain” (1976, 223, my emphasis).
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ask whether a novel behaviour can come not from breaking 
mechanical rules, but from following them: from doing, in 
other words, what computers do already, and not what we 
might think they should be doing if we wanted them to imi-
tate us. Novelty, then, can be found in the distinctiveness of 
the mode of thought that machines express, and which arises 
from self-determinate and self-determining rule following. 
In this sense, and to conclude: this reformulated question 
about novel thought in computation involves re-defining and 
enlarging the prospect of what rule-based thought might be, 
along with reconsidering what rules themselves are. The 
issue that comes to the fore, then, is whether novelty in com-
putation might be described as predicated on a form of onto-
logical and epistemological autonomy in the normatively 
instrumental dimension of computational automation.
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